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Why	Free	Will	is	Real	–	Book	Review
If	you	are	interested	in	this	book,	you	may	like	to	listen	to	a	podcast	of	Professor	Christian	List’s	LSE	lecture,	‘Free
Will	in	a	Deterministic	World?’,	recorded	on	4	December	2012.		
Why	Free	Will	Is	Real.	Christian	List.	Harvard	University	Press.	2019.
The	universe	may	very	well	be	deterministic.	According	to	many	physicists,	there	are
natural	laws	that	govern	the	universe.	On	most	specifications,	these	laws	are
deterministic,	meaning	that	they	pair	with	the	initial	conditions	set	at	the	Big	Bang	to
determine	every	future	state	of	the	universe.	If	determinism	is	true,	all	physical	facts
of	the	universe	are	decided	and	unchanging.
Determinism	poses	a	substantial	problem	for	free	will.	Say	I	am	choosing	between
moving	my	coffee	cup	or	leaving	it	be.	If	determinism	is	true,	the	physical	states	of	my
body,	my	brain	and	the	coffee	cup	are	all	already	decided.	How	then	can	I	choose	to
move	the	cup?	It	seems	instead	that	the	choice	has	been	made	for	me.	My	brain	and
body	will	move	following	the	natural	laws’	current.	I	will	move	the	cup	if	the	laws	of	the
universe	require	me	to	do	so.	While	the	movement	feels	voluntary,	instead	it	may
simply	be	a	function	of	deterministic	physics,	rather	than	personal	choice	or	free	will.
This	is	a	frightening	possibility.	We	may	feel	that	our	lives	are	up	to	us,	that	we	can
choose	our	profession	or	outfit	or	partner.	However,	this	challenge	from	determinism
presents	the	possibility	that	none	of	these	seeming	choices	is	ours	to	make.	Instead,
they	were	decided	at	the	Big	Bang,	before	we	ever	existed.	Determinism	presents	a
fundamental	challenge	to	the	existence	of	free	will.
In	Why	Free	Will	Is	Real,	Christian	List	argues	that	free	will	is	real	despite	the	possibility	of	deterministic	physics.	In
fact,	determinism	is	merely	one	of	three	challenges	that	List	confronts	against	free	will.	Radical	materialism,
determinism	and	epiphenomenalism	are	the	three	primary	objections	in	the	philosophical	literature	to	the	existence
of	free	will.	List	replies	to	these	three	challenges	using	flavours	of	one	central	insight:	free	will	is	a	high-level
phenomenon	not	found	in	fundamental	physics.	While	List	recognises	that	this	insight	has	been	proposed	by	others,
his	treatment	is	the	first	presentation	that	responds	to	all	three	primary	challenges.
LSE Business Review: Why Free Will is Real – Book Review Page 1 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-05-24
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2020/05/24/why-free-will-is-real-book-review/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
According	to	the	first	objection,	the	challenge	from	radical	materialism,	the	human	organism	is	merely	a	machine.
While	talk	of	intentional	thoughts	is	useful	in	everyday	life,	in	science	it	is	a	remnant	of	folk	psychology	and	will	be
replaced	by	neuroscientific	theories	of	human	behaviour.		But	free	will	requires	a	person	to	be	able	to	have	an
intentional	thought.	Therefore,	because	the	human	mind	is	radically	materialistic,	there	is	no	free	will	—	or	so	the
challenge	posits.
List	responds	that	intentionality	—		the	ability	to	have	mental	representations	of	the	world,	like	beliefs,	goals	and
intentions	—		is	a	high-level	psychological	phenomenon	rather	than	a	phenomenon	to	be	found	in	the	brain.	This	is
not	a	dualist	assertion	where	the	mind	exists	independently	of	the	brain.	Instead,	mental	properties	like	intentions
are	realised	by	the	brain,	but	are	not	identical	to	brain	properties.
Furthermore,	ascriptions	of	intentionality	have	been	indispensable	to	our	understanding	of	other	humans.	The
flourishing	of	psychology,	sociology	and	economics	exhibits	this.	List	argues	that	the	theories	found	in	these
disciplines	are	not	merely	shorthand	for	theories	about	brain	states.		Instead,	they	provide	independently	valuable
explanations	about	human	behaviour	that	would	be	erased	if	we	adopted	a	radical	materialism.	Consequently,	List
argues	that	free	will	withstands	the	challenge	from	radical	materialism.
Next	up	is	the	challenge	from	determinism,	with	which	we	are	already	familiar.	The	keystone	aspect	of	the
challenge	is	that	determinism	seems	to	imply	that	there	are	no	alternative	possibilities.	Therefore,	a	person	is
incapable	of	making	a	choice.	List	replies	by	arguing	that	determinism	in	the	fundamental	physics	does	not
necessitate	‘agent-level’	determinism,	which	is	the	level	of	a	person’s	choice.	This	stems	from	the	central	argument
that	free	will	is	a	high-level	property.	In	this	case,	mental	states	like	choices	can	be	realised	by	multiple	brain	states.
For	example,	all	of	our	brains	are	slightly	different,	and	yet	we	can	each	still	form	the	intention	to	move	a	coffee	cup.
In	this	way,	mental	states	are	multiply	realisable.	List	argues	that	this	means	there	are	multiple	alternative	possible
intentions	I	could	form,	even	if	my	brain	state	is	predetermined	by	deterministic	physics.	Therefore,	there	can	still	be
indeterminism	at	the	agent	level,	even	if	there	is	determinism	at	the	physical	level.
Finally,	the	challenge	from	epiphenomenalism	originates	from	a	classic	metaphysical	problem.		Philosophers	and
scientists	alike	claim	that	all	physical	events	have	sufficient	physical	causes.		Furthermore,	they	often	agree	that	a
physical	event	does	not	have	more	than	one	simultaneous,	sufficient	physical	cause.	Finally,	as	mentioned	earlier,
the	mind	is	realised	by	the	brain.	These	three	principles	challenge	the	possibility	of	a	person’s	mental	state,	like	an
intention,	having	any	causal	impact	on	the	world.	When	I	move	my	coffee	cup,	the	physical	state	of	my	brain
initiates	a	causal	chain	that	leads	to	the	cup	moving.	My	physical	state,	and	the	state	of	my	surrounding
environment,	is	a	sufficient	cause	of	the	cup	moving.	Therefore,	there	does	not	seem	to	be	room	for	my	mental
state	to	have	any	causal	role.	My	brain	state	was	already	the	cause,	and	the	event	cannot	have	two	simultaneous
causes.	This	encapsulates	epiphenomenalism.	Because	free	will	seems	to	require	that	our	mental	states	have
causal	control	in	the	world,	epiphenomenalism	challenges	its	existence.
List	replies	to	this	final	objection	by	appealing	one	final	time	to	his	central	claim:	free	will	is	a	high-level
phenomenon,	not	one	to	be	found	in	the	fundamental	physics.	List	relates	mental	causation	to	the	case	of	a	glass
flask	breaking	when	the	water	inside	it	boils.	In	both	events,	there	seem	to	be	two	places	to	identify	causation:	the
microphysical	state	(the	brain	state	and	the	state	of	the	water	molecules)	or	the	higher-level	state	(the	mental	state
and	the	boiling	of	the	water).	Either	the	specific	arrangement	of	the	molecules	caused	the	glass	to	break	or	the
overall	boiling	did.	Similarly,	either	the	specific	microphysical	state	of	my	brain	caused	me	to	move	the	cup	or	else
my	mental	intention	did.	List	argues	that,	in	the	water	case,	it	would	be	wrong	to	identify	causation	in	the	lower
level,	because	different	arrangements	of	water	molecules	would	have	still	led	to	the	glass	breaking.	Boiling	is
multiply	realisable,	because	different	microphysical	states	of	the	molecules	can	still	constitute	boiling.	Therefore,
perturbing	the	microphysical	state	of	the	water	would	not	necessarily	have	prevented	the	breaking.	However,	the
glass	would	not	have	broken	had	the	water	not	boiled.	Consequently,	causation	should	be	found,	according	to	List,
in	the	higher-level	state	of	boiling,	rather	than	the	lower-level	microphysical	state.	He	claims	the	mental	case	is
analogous,	because	mental	states	are	multiply	realisable	in	the	brain.
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List’s	three	replies	are	clear,	concise	and	accessible	to	a	non-specialist.	Even	more	importantly,	they	blend	into	one
cohesive	positive	argument	for	the	existence	of	free	will.	Philosophers	are	sometimes	known	to	find	a	single
method	or	insight	and	spread	it	across	their	work	as	if	it	is	new	each	time.	This	faulty	method	is	the	opposite	of
List’s	approach.	List	surveys	the	three	primary	challenges	to	the	existence	of	free	will	and	genealogises	them	to
one	fundamental	misunderstanding.	He	then	proposes	an	alternative	positive	theory,	according	to	which	free	will	is
not	to	be	found	in	physics	because	it	is	a	higher-level	phenomenon,	just	like	biology	is	of	a	higher	level	than
chemistry.
His	argument	is	largely	convincing,	even	for	specialists.	However,	it	does	not	engage	with	all	the	nitty	gritty
philosophical	details,	probably	because	it	is	written	for	a	broad	audience.	The	three	suggested	places	his	argument
could	be	improved	are	narrow	objections	within	these	details.	First,	List	assumes	certain	metaphysical	properties	of
natural	laws	that	are	objected	to	elsewhere	in	the	philosophical	literature.	This	would	not	be	a	problem	if	List
presented,	or	at	least	pointed	to,	a	reply	to	these	objections.	List	assumes	that	natural	laws	somehow	‘govern’	the
physical	universe,	but	he	does	not	specify	what	‘govern’	could	mean.	The	laws	themselves	are	not	physical	objects
that	can	causally	interact	with	other	physical	objects.	So	how	can	they	play	a	causal	role	in	the	universe?		This	is	a
classic	philosophical	puzzle	about	the	nature	of	laws,	and	List	does	not	need	to	provide	a	thorough	reply.	That
being	said,	the	puzzle	deserves	at	least	a	reference	to	help	skeptical	specialists	enter	into	his	argument	in	the	first
place.	This	could	be	remedied	simply	with	a	few	paragraphs	in	the	introduction.
Second,	and	slightly	more	substantial,	List’s	argument	often	appeals	to	the	explanatory	value	of	free	will	within	the
social	sciences.	As	outlined	in	the	above	discussion	of	the	radical	materialism	objection,	List	argues	that	the
indispensability	of	intentionality	talk	for	explaining	human	behaviour	in	economics	and	sociology	justifies	his	claim
that	intentionality	is	real.	This	is	a	metaphysically	tricky	claim	because	it	equates	the	realness	of	an	entity	with	its
explanatory	usefulness.	Why	think	that	the	pragmatic	value	of	explaining	behaviour	in	terms	of	an	entity	provides
evidence	for	the	claim	that	that	entity	actually	exists	out	there	in	the	world?	To	use	a	value-laden	example,	many
would	likely	argue	that	gender	does	not	exist	out	there	in	the	world	as	a	metaphysical	entity,	even	though	it	is
sometimes	valuable	to	do	economics	and	sociology	in	reference	to	it.	Why	think	that	explanation	has	bearing	on	the
metaphysics?	List	does	reply	to	this	objection,	referencing	many	cases	in	physics	where	we	assume	the	existence
of	some	entity	because	its	existence	has	been	demonstrated	experimentally,	even	if	we	are	unable	to	observe	the
entity	itself.		The	reply	that	physics	often	assumes	metaphysical	existence	from	explanatory	usefulness	is	a	strong
one,	particularly	when	discussing	the	social	sciences.
This	brings	to	light	one	final	consideration	about	List’s	presentation.	List’s	argument	rests	solely	on	the	third-person
perspective,	where	free	will	is	ascribed	to	others.	This	is	valuable	because	it	is	the	primary	perspective	used	in	the
social	sciences.	That	being	said,	free	will	seems	intertwined	with	the	first	person	as	well.		Our	ability	to	think
through	choices	on	our	own	and	then	implement	those	choices	is	importantly	personal.	Appealing	to	explanatory
usefulness	is	valuable	when	the	free-will	discussion	is	put	alongside	the	social	sciences,	which	seek	to	explain
human	behaviour.	However,	the	explanatory	usefulness	of	free	will	seems	less	valuable	when	thinking	about	the
first-person,	personal	perspective	of	decision-making.	List	decidedly	does	not	engage	with	this	perspective,	but	it
would	be	worthwhile	for	him	to	justify	this	choice	more	thoroughly.
In	all,	List’s	argument	is	accessible,	clear	and	convincing.		He	argues	for	the	existence	of	free	will	in	the	face	of
three	seemingly	insurmountable	objections	by	appealing	to	one	primary	and	powerful	insight.	While	a	few	features
of	his	argument	could	be	expanded	upon,	the	intended	audience	and	brevity	of	the	piece	take	deserved
precedence.	List’s	carefully	crafted	argument	may	help	many	of	us	sleep	more	soundly,	being	further	assured	that
we	can	choose	how	to	live	our	own	lives.	Free	will	may	very	well	be	real.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	was	originally	published	by	LSE	Review	of	Books.
The	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
Featured	image	by	qimono,	under	a	Pixabay	licence
When	you	leave	a	comment,	you’re	agreeing	to	our	Comment	Policy
LSE Business Review: Why Free Will is Real – Book Review Page 3 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-05-24
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2020/05/24/why-free-will-is-real-book-review/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
Ellie	Lasater-Guttmann	is	a	Ph.D.	candidate	in	philosophy	at	Harvard	University.		Previously,	she	completed	her
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